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 Introduction 
 
The objective of this document is to assess the value of launch collision avoidance 
(COLA) practices and provide recommendations regarding its implementation for NASA 
robotic missions.  The scope of this effort is limited to launch COLA screens against catalog 
objects that are either spacecraft or debris.  No modifications to manned safety COLA 
practices are considered in this effort.  
 
An assessment of the value of launch COLA can be broken down into two fundamental 
questions: 
 
1) Does collision during launch represent a significant risk to either the payload being 
launched or the space environment? 
2) Can launch collision mitigation be performed in a manner that provides meaningful risk 
reduction at an acceptable level of operational impact? 
 
While it has been possible to piece together partial answers to these questions for 
some time, the first attempt to comprehensively address them is documented in reference 
(a), Launch COLA Operations: an Examination of Data Products, Procedures, and 
Thresholds, Revision A.  This report is the product of an extensive study that addressed 
fundamental technical questions surrounding launch collision avoidance analysis and 
practice.  The results provided in reference (a) will be cited throughout this document as 
these two questions are addressed. 
 
The premise of this assessment is that in order to conclude that launch COLA is a 
value-added activity, the answer to both of these questions must be affirmative.  A “no” 
answer to either of these questions points toward the conclusion that launch COLA provides 
little or no risk mitigation benefit.  The remainder of this assessment will focus on addressing 
these two questions.   
  
Risk Posed by Collision During Launch 
 
On the surface, the issue of a collision between a launch vehicle (and its associated 
payload) and existing on-orbit objects appears to be straightforward.  It is widely recognized 
that space is crowded, with approximately 20,000 on-orbit objects currently cataloged by the 
US Air Force’s Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC).  It is easy to visualize, then, that a 
launch vehicle heading to its prescribed orbit must fly through a buzzing cloud of operational 
satellites, spent rocket stages, and various other debris, and that collision with any of these 
objects would have serious, if not catastrophic, consequences.  Furthermore, since the 
orbits of these objects are known fairly accurately, and the trajectory of the launch vehicle is 
also known in advance, it seems both possible and prudent to compare the launch vehicle’s 
projected path for all possible launch times with the propagated states of the objects in the 
JSpOC’s catalog to identify possible collisions.  These potential collisions can then by 
mitigated by not launching at those times when an unacceptable collision risk presents itself. 
 
In reality, however, there are numerous subtleties associated with this problem that 
render it non-trivial.  The first, most basic of these, is the question of overall collision risk.  If 
no mitigation steps are taken, what is the likelihood that a collision will take place?  This 
question is fundamental in that it represents a characterization of the risk being mitigated, 
and its answer quantifies the importance of launch collision risk in relation to other risks that 
must be managed by NASA. 
  
The study documented in reference (a) provides a comprehensive examination of this 
question.  Systematic Monte Carlo analysis demonstrates that the odds of a launch vehicle 
striking a space object during launch are extremely small, even when no active mitigation 
measures are employed.  Using a set of five representative launch trajectories analyzed 
over a total of 216,000 distinct screenings, this study showed that the median risk of 
collision (based on the higher precision SP object catalog) is approximately 4 x 10-8 for any 
given single launch, with a 5th-95th percentile range of 3 x 10-12 to 8 x 10-7.  If the trade space 
is expanded to include not just a given single launch, but a collection of launches over time, 
the risk that a collision will occur correspondingly increases.  The cumulative median risk 
crosses the 10-6 threshold after about six launches, 10-5 after about 50 launches, and 10-4 
after about 460 launches.  These results are in general agreement with a much more 
rudimentary previous assessment documented in reference (b).  
 
Of course, the cumulative probability of collision is dependent on the state of the on-
orbit population, and will increase as that population grows over time; this effect is not 
explicitly captured in this analysis.  It should be noted, however, that the probability of 
collision is roughly proportional to on-orbit object density, so unless the on-orbit population 
grows by roughly an order of magnitude, the overall conclusions presented here should not 
be substantially affected.  Based on analyses published by the NASA Orbital Debris 
Program Office as represented in references (c) and (d), an order of magnitude increase in 
on-orbit population is very unlikely, even projecting 100 years or more into the future.  
 
It is readily apparent that the risk of collision during launch is much lower than the 
background risk of mission failure due to other causes (historically on the order of 10-2, even 
for mature launch systems).  Given the difference of four or more orders of magnitude 
between the risk of launch collision and overall risk of launch failure, and the plethora of 
other potential failure modes with a greater likelihood of occurrence than a collision during 
launch, it is difficult to cast launch collision risk as a significant mission success concern.  Of 
course, there are specific instances where a risk assessment like this may not be 
appropriate.  These situations can be identified explicitly and directly mitigated through 
prudent mission design practices.  In order to mitigate risk to high-valued assets, in some 
cases insertion orbits can be selected that preclude the possibility of collision.  For example, 
spacecraft whose ultimate destination is in NASA’s Earth Observing System (EOS) 
constellation can be (and routinely are) intentionally inserted by the launch vehicle into an 
orbit below that of the constellation to eliminate the possibility of collision with existing EOS 
assets.  These spacecraft are then carefully maneuvered into final position using on-board 
propulsion capability.  
 
It has also been argued that while collision during launch may not have a significant 
effect on launch mission success, it could present a long-term risk to the space environment.  
The reasoning behind this argument is that a collision between a launch vehicle and on-orbit 
object would produce a cloud of debris that would increase the on-orbit debris population 
and potentially place a large number of on-orbit assets at a perpetually elevated risk of 
collision.  However, analysis of the evolution of the on-orbit debris environment performed 
by NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office and documented in reference (c) supports the 
contention that collision during launch in fact does not pose a significant risk to the space 
environment over the long term.  This reference indicates that collisions between existing 
on-orbit objects are expected to occur at an average rate of approximately 1 every 5 years 
over the next 200 years, approximately half of which are projected to be “catastrophic” 
debris-producing events.  By comparison, the risk of a single launch collision occurring at 
some point, even over the course of hundreds of launches, is at least three to four orders of 
 magnitude below this background condition.  Additionally, explicit analysis of the effect of 
active on-orbit collision avoidance documented in reference (c) demonstrates that even if all 
active payloads are removed from the pool of potential colliding bodies, the effect on the 
growth of the debris population is negligible.  In a general sense, active on-orbit collision 
avoidance measures offer no benefit from the standpoint of limiting long-term debris 
population growth in orbit (although it could provide shorter term risk reduction for groups of 
satellites flying in similar orbits), and since launch collision avoidance is by its very nature 
much more limited in scope that its on-orbit counterpart, its effect on the long-term debris 
population is even less significant.  Potential near-term concerns over debris clouds that 
could be produced in orbits that coincide with high-valued payloads and/or constellations 
can be mitigated through careful launch vehicle target orbit selection, as mentioned 
previously. 
 
Thus, from the standpoint of both the specific mission being launched and the on-orbit 
environment in general, extensive analysis demonstrates that launch collision risk is several 
orders of magnitude below known baseline levels.  This conclusion supports the contention 
that the insignificant incremental risk presented by launch collision does not warrant active 
mitigation.  
 
Launch Collision Mitigation Effectiveness 
 
The central question regarding the effectiveness of launch collision mitigation comes 
down to whether preflight analysis can result in a significant reduction in the risk of collision 
at an acceptable cost in terms of both resources and operational impacts.  The following 
discussion will focus primarily on the tradeoff between risk reduction and operational 
impacts; financial and other resource requirements are beyond the scope of this document. 
 
This discussion is based on the premise that technically sound analytical techniques, 
tools, and supporting data exist that can be brought to bear on the launch COLA problem.  
Reference (a) addresses this issue in great detail, concluding that: 
 
1) The necessary input data to support probability-based screening is available; most 
significantly, existing methods of characterizing launch vehicle state uncertainty in flight 
are technically sound and consistent with flight data. 
2) It is reasonable to use either the SP or GP catalog for probability-based screening, with 
the lower-fidelity GP catalog producing slightly more conservative results in general. 
3) Miss distance based screening does not correlate with risk in any direct, practical way, 
and should not be used as a substitute for probability-based screening. 
 
Given these three assertions, it can be concluded that launch collision probabilities 
indeed can be determined in a technically sound manner.  These points will not be 
discussed in any detail here, and the reader is referred to reference (a) for extensive 
supporting information and discussion.  However, it should be noted that assertion 1 above 
is of particular importance to subsequent discussion.  This is because probability of collision 
is a function of three basic characteristics: the geometry of the encounter between the two 
objects, the sizes and shapes of the objects, and uncertainties in the objects’ states.  The 
first two contributing factors are reasonably well characterized and noncontroversial; 
likewise, the uncertainties associated with on-orbit objects are generally known and 
accepted.  However, the analytically-produced state uncertainties associated with launch 
vehicle trajectories have historically been viewed with a certain amount of skepticism, and 
even mistrust, within the launch COLA community.  As it happens, launch vehicle state 
 uncertainties play the primary role in answering the question of launch COLA effectiveness 
due to the fact that they are typically much larger than those associated with on-orbit 
objects, and as a result they tend to be the dominant factor in the calculation of collision 
probability.  Therefore, one of the most critical aspects of the study documented in reference 
(a) was to verify or refute the viability of analytically produced launch vehicle uncertainties 
through statistical comparison with flight data.  Reference (a) clearly demonstrates that for 
mature existing launch vehicle fleets, the trajectory uncertainties that feed collision 
probability calculations, while large, are indeed technically sound.  Again, the reader is 
referred to reference (a) for a complete discussion of this topic. 
 
Given the premise that collision probability can be calculated in a technically sound 
manner, it becomes possible to use existing analytical techniques to quantify the benefits of 
actively screening launches to identify and eliminate launch opportunities that involve 
conjunctions with probabilities of collision above a predetermined screening threshold.  This 
is done by comparing the cumulative risk of collision incurred when no active measures are 
taken (discussed in the previous section) against the cumulative risk obtained by actively 
screening launches against the on-orbit catalog.  Intuitively, the outcome of this sort of 
comparison will depend on the screening threshold selected, with the expectation that 
screening at tighter (i.e., lower) threshold values will result in lower cumulative risk.  By 
sampling multiple trajectories at various launch COLA screening thresholds, statistics on the 
risk of collision as a function of the number of launch events and COLA screening threshold 
can be constructed; the results of this sort of approach are documented in reference (a) and 
presented in Figure 1 below.  (These results are based on the higher fidelity SP catalog; 
results using the GP catalog are generally similar.)  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Cumulative Risk of Collision as a Function of Screening Threshold 
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Figure 2: Effect of Screening Threshold on Launch Window 
 
 
Note that the curves for no screening at all and a screening threshold of 10-5 are 
coincident; this illustrates the (initially) somewhat surprising conclusion that screening at a 
maximum probability of collision threshold of 10-5 or higher offers no benefit, from an overall 
risk standpoint, over not conducting screenings at all, regardless of the number of launch 
events considered.  The dispersions (uncertainties) in the predicted launch trajectories, due 
both to uncertainties in rocket motor and guidance system performance, as well as winds 
and other unpredictable environmental factors on launch day, are large enough that they 
dominate the probability of collision calculation—given these uncertainties in the predicted 
position, it is simply not possible to generate a calculated likelihood greater than 
approximately 1 in 100,000 that a launching vehicle will intercept a resident space object.  
As the graph below shows, one must lower the threshold to 10-6 to begin to see some actual 
reduction in risk (a factor of two); and a threshold of 10-7 is required to begin to approach an 
order-of-magnitude benefit. 
 
Screening at such low levels does not come without a cost in terms of operational 
impact.  The data in reference (a) can be used to determine the relationship between risk 
improvement and launch window impact.  This relationship is complex but as an example, 
screening at a threshold of 10-7 (which provides less than an order of magnitude 
improvement in cumulative risk) results in the loss of 65-70% of the nominal launch window 
(95th percentile) for launch windows between 10 and 60 minutes in duration using the SP 
catalog.  This relationship is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Thus, it appears that while technically sound methodologies do exist to compute 
collision probabilities, the risk reduction can be regarded as minimal at best, and then only 
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 at very low risk levels accompanied by potentially significant operational impacts.  Therefore, 
some additional comparisons should be made to help put launch COLA into perspective with 
existing similar practices within the agency. 
 
Risk Threshold Comparisons 
 
Although no agency-wide launch COLA standard exists, there are other, related 
practices currently implemented within NASA that can be examined to gain insight into 
agency risk tolerance for this type of issue. 
 
One prominent source of insight here is the existing process employed by NASA for on-
orbit conjunction assessment and collision avoidance for the International Space Station 
(ISS).  The ISS is actively screened against the entire on-orbit catalog on an ongoing basis 
using catalog data, tools, and analytical methods that are similar or identical to those used 
for launch conjunction assessment.  Reference (e) defines the maneuver criteria for ISS in 
response to on-orbit conjunctions.  Of most relevance to this discussion is the fact that the 
document establishes a “green” probability of collision as 10-5 or less, meaning that under 
this condition debris avoidance maneuvers are not conducted.  Furthermore, even for 
probabilities of collision between 10-5 and 10-4 (“yellow” condition) and greater than 10-4 
(“red” condition), maneuvers are not mandatory, and can be waived under certain 
circumstances.  
 
From a risk tolerance perspective, it is difficult to argue that collisions involving robotic 
launches are inherently less risk tolerant than those involving risk to human life aboard ISS.  
From a risk management perspective, then, it would seem consistent to screen launch 
conjunctions at a probability threshold that is no lower than that applied to ISS collision 
screening on orbit.  If this approach – specifically, that no action is taken for probabilities of 
collision below 10-5 – is employed for launch screening, it can be concluded that active 
screening is not necessary because we now know that screening at that level or higher has 
no effect on overall cumulative risk of collision based on the results in reference (a).  In 
order to see even a small reduction in cumulative risk, screenings must be conducted at a 
level below 10-6, with all of the associated impacts to launch window.  
 
A similar comparison with on-orbit screening practices for robotic payloads can also be 
performed, although the story is not quite as straightforward.  NASA performs continuous 
conjunction assessment for approximately 70 specific unmanned assets.  As part of this 
process, affected spacecraft operators are provided with notification information when the 
probability of collision exceeds approximately 10-7 and full analysis packages when the 
probability of collision exceeds approximately 10-4.  Unlike the ISS situation described 
above, there are no firmly established requirements for executing an avoidance maneuver 
for robotic spacecraft; instead, a number of event-specific aspects, such as conjunction 
geometry, quality of orbit determination solution(s), event parameter history, and space 
weather conditions, are all considered in addition to the calculated probability of collision in 
determining whether active remediation is appropriate.  However, in the main, some sort of 
risk mitigation action is typically pursued for probability of collision levels greater than 5 x 10-
4. 
 
Potential basis for comparison can also be sought in NASA’s existing orbital debris 
policy, as documented in reference (f).  This document provides explicit requirements aimed 
at limiting the production of orbital debris by NASA space missions, as well as protecting the 
populace from risks associated with orbital debris.  An examination of the various thresholds 
outlined in this standard provides some insight into historical risk levels accepted by NASA 
 at the agency level; pertinent threshold values are listed in Table 1 below.  The reader is 
referred to reference (f) for more details on each of these requirements. 
 
Table 1: NASA Orbital Debris Requirement Risk Thresholds 
Requirement Description Threshold 
4.4-1 Accidental explosion during deployment and mission operations 10-3 
4.5-1 Risk of collision with large (i.e., tracked) objects over the lifetime 
of a space system 
10-3 
4.7-1 Risk of human casualty associated with reentry 10-4 
 
These specific orbital debris requirements are useful in identifying precedent for the 
agency’s risk tolerance when it comes to matters of on-orbit collision and space debris 
generation.  The first two table entries are closely related to the launch COLA problem in 
that their direct concern is limiting the generation of space debris.  In particular, requirement 
4.5-1, which applies to launch vehicle hardware as well as spacecraft, establishes a total 
limit on collision risk during the lifetime of a space system.  If we consider the risk of collision 
during launch as a contributor to this total limit (even though reference (f) does not explicitly 
do so), we know from the earlier discussion based on reference (a) that its contribution is so 
small as to be insignificant even without active launch COLA measures.  The limit on risk of 
human casualty (requirement 4.7-1) is included here to provide some general risk tolerance 
perspective.  If NASA were to screen against launch collision at a level comparable to that 
already established for global human casualty risk there would be no reduction in the overall 
risk of collision; indeed, screening at a level three orders of magnitude more stringent than 
the risk level already accepted for human casualty would be required to have a meaningful 
effect on the overall risk of collision during launch.  From an objective standpoint, it appears 
difficult to justify treating launch collision screening in a manner that is at least a thousand 
times more conservative than the established human casualty risk tolerance threshold. 
 
Although it is difficult to establish an “apples-to-apples” equivalence between launch 
collision risk and existing risk thresholds already applied within NASA, three areas were 
identified that were similar enough in nature for consideration – collision avoidance for the 
International Space Station, on-orbit collision avoidance for NASA’s robotic assets, and 
existing orbital debris mitigation policy.  Based on a survey of these existing risk 
management policies and practices, it is recommended that a probability of collision 
threshold for NASA robotic mission launches should be no lower than 10-4 (1 in 10,000).  
This threshold is consistent with existing on-orbit screening COLA practices, and recognizes 
a level of risk acceptance for unmanned assets that is no more stringent than that for human 
casualty, both in terms of humans on orbit (i.e., ISS inhabitants) and the general population 
on the ground. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the introduction, two fundamental questions were posed whose answers would 
produce a framework for a technically sound launch COLA policy.  The answers to these 
questions are summarized below. 
 
Does collision during launch represent a significant risk to either the payload being 
launched or the space environment?  Analysis shows that the risk posed by collision 
during launch is many orders of magnitude below existing background risks to both the 
specific mission being launched and the space environment, leading to the conclusion that 
launch collision risk is not a significant concern. 
  
Can launch collision mitigation be performed in a manner that provides meaningful 
risk reduction at an acceptable cost?  Sound analytical methods exist that allow the 
probability of collision to be reliably calculated prior to launch for conjunctions between a 
launch vehicle in flight and on-orbit objects, and such methods are in use today.  However, 
the fundamental nature of the launch COLA problem (primarily the large uncertainties 
associated with launch vehicle flight) severely limits the ultimate benefit realized by 
performing launch COLA analysis.  Screening launch conjunctions at risk levels that are 
consistent with similar existing NASA policies and practices provides no risk benefit, while 
screening at tighter collision probability thresholds provides minimal incremental benefit at 
the cost of significant impacts to launch windows. 
 
Recommendations 
 
A cumulative collision threshold of 10-4 for a given launch opportunity represents a risk 
level that is generally consistent with existing agency policies and practices regarding on-
orbit collisions and orbital debris management.  Furthermore, comprehensive analysis 
demonstrates that screening at this level offers no benefit over performing no active 
screening at all.  This is because individual conjunctions with probabilities greater than 10-5 
do not exist due to the large uncertainties associated with preflight launch vehicle 
trajectories.  This position is supported by extensive statistical analysis, which has verified 
that large preflight predicted uncertainties are consistent with flight data, and are valid 
representations of how launch vehicles operate. 
 
Based on the answers to the two questions posed in the introduction, it can be seen 
that across-the-board launch collision avoidance screening against unmanned objects in the 
on-orbit catalog offers no real value from a risk reduction standpoint.  Thus, it is 
recommended that this practice be discontinued for NASA robotic launches.  This position 
should be periodically evaluated based on the evolution of launch vehicle guidance, 
navigation, and control systems as well as growth in the on-orbit population, although 
significant changes in these parameters (on the order of an order of magnitude or more) 
would be required to significantly affect this recommendation. 
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